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Abstract This article presents findings concerned with the use of neural networks 
in the identification of deceptive behaviour. A game designed by psychologists 
and criminologists was used for the generation of data used to test the 
appropriateness of different AI techniques in the quest for counter-terrorism. A 
feed forward back propagation network was developed and subsequent neural 
network experiments showed on average a 60% success rate and at best a 68% 
success rate for correctly identifying deceptive behaviour. These figures indicate 
that, as part of an investigator support system, a neural network would be a 
valuable tool in the identification of terrorists prior to an attack.  
1 Introduction  
DScent was a joint project between five UK universities combining research 
theories in the disciplines of computational inference, forensic psychology and 
expert decision-making in the area of counter-terrorism.  This article discusses the 
findings of research and development around the role and the use of neural 
networks as a tool for identifying deception in the field of counter-terrorism.  
For the purpose of data generation and system testing the project team devised 
a closed world game called “Cutting Corners”. This game was used as a test-bed 
to allow development, application and validation of an artificial intelligence (AI) 
approach for identifying deceptive behaviour. Within the game participants acted 
as teams and traversed certain locations using GPS enabled devises to 
communicate, navigate and purchase items. The game participants either acted as 
potentially dishonest2 builders who were constructing part of an Olympic stadium, 
or terrorists masquerading as builders with the aim of planting explosives. The 
game was divided into rounds with a certain number of dice throws per player and 
the winner was the first to accomplish their aim.   
Each game consisted of four players with between one and three players acting 
as terrorists. During the game the players could visit three different types of virtual 
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location: the Builders Yard, selling virtual construction blocks, soil and fertiliser; 
the Electronics Store, selling virtual wiring and dynamite and the Olympic Site, 
where virtual items could be unloaded. An initial amount of virtual cash and a 
virtual van was given to each player at the beginning of a game. During the game 
van searches and van weight checks were carried out where players displayed two 
items in their van and were weighed respectively. If the van exceeded the 
maximum weight allowance the player did not receive a cash reward. On 
completion of each round the sum of items sold from each shop was calculated. 
An investigator support system, known as DScentTrail [1], was developed that 
presented graphical scent trails3 of a suspect over time. This support system was 
underpinned by a neural network to help identify and highlight deceptive 
behaviour. Preliminary work was carried out on a behavioural based AI module 
which would work separately alongside the neural network, with both identifying 
deception before integrating their results to update DScentTrail. 
2 AI Techniques for Counter-Terrorism  
The use of various AI techniques, such as data mining, artificial neural networks, 
symbolic AI and Case Based Reasoning for counter-terrorism have been 
advocated by Markman [2] and Marappan [3].  Schneier [4] however, in his article 
on Why Data Mining Won’t Stop Terror, writes that data mining works best when 
you're searching for a well-defined profile, a reasonable number of attacks per 
year and a low cost of false alarms.  Rudmin [5] is also sceptical regarding the use 
of data mining techniques and disregards them completely as in order to make a 
Bayesian computation, he estimates that at best in the USA there would be a base-
rate of 1 terrorist per 300,000 people and that if a surveillance monitoring system 
had an accuracy rate of 40% positive identification of real terrorists then according 
to Bayes‟ Theorem the misidentification rate would be .01%, or 30,000 innocent 
people.  Rudmin stresses that these numbers are simply examples based on one 
particular technology. Jonas and Harper [6] in their report on Effective 
Counterterrorism and the Limited Role of Predictive Data Mining agree with 
Rudmin regarding the unacceptable number of likely false positives, they state that 
it would be a waste of resources and a threat to civil liberties. In addition to the 
high number of false positives, they argue against the usefulness of predictive data 
mining for counterterrorism due to the absence of terrorism patterns, leaving it 
impossible to develop useful algorithms.  
Data mining was not used on the DScent project since it is generally used for 
extracting information from large quantities of data that is collected for reasons 
other than for the purpose of mining itself.  The DScent data was explicitly 
designed and collected for identifying suspicious behaviour.  DScent would not 
encounter the problems outlined by Rudmin, Jonas or Harper of having to 
                                            
3 A scent trail within the project is a collection of ordered, relevant behavioural information over 
time for a suspect.   
A Neural Network for Counter-Terrorism 
potentially question a huge number of innocent people as the set did not contain 
the entire population, it was merely a well established sub-set.  Ware [7] states that 
neural networks do not lend themselves easily to real-time updated information, 
and has concerns regarding the limited availability of historical data. Although 
Ware‟s observations may be valid, by identifying the key input factors to the 
neural network and keeping these to an absolute minimum, the amount of 
historical data required for training will be far less.  Furthermore, if the neural 
network can identify deception amongst humans from a small amount of inputs 
then we are getting closer to that well-defined profile of which Schneier speaks. 
The choice of a neural network was made as it is the most likely technique that 
will work with a non-polynomial problem such as behavioural patterns of humans.  
Jonas and Harper are correct when they state that it is impossible to design 
algorithms if no differences exist in terrorist and non-terrorist behaviours, though 
the project team believe that differences may exist. A neural network was chosen 
at this stage to identify whether these differences did occur. Preliminary work 
within DScent has paved the way for further research into this area which, 
providing differences in behaviour can be identified, will include the development 
of a hybrid AI system including both a neural network and a behavioural based AI 
module. 
3 Development 
Feed forward back-propagation neural networks were developed using the JOONE 
toolset [8] which is an object based neural network framework with a graphical 
user interface. EasyNN-plus [9] was used to validate the output from Joone. The 
neural network architecture took the input data from an Excel spreadsheet entering 
the input layer containing 122 neurons, the data progressed to a hidden layer 
containing 10 neurons, before it finally reached the output layer which contained a 
single neuron. The output value was in the range zero to one and was passed into 
an Excel spreadsheet, all three layers utilised the sigmoid activation function 
[10]. The Teacher layer trained the network by presenting it with complete 
examples, including whether the example was a terrorist or not (this is known as 
supervised learning). The training was then presented graphically via a Root Mean 
Square Error chart (RMSE) [11] examples of which are presented within the 
DScent Final Report [1]. 
The data from the Cutting Corners board game was collated into an Excel 
spread sheet.  The spread sheet contained 144 rows of game data which resulted 
from playing 36 games.  This game data was divided into separate training and 
test files with a ratio of 4:1 respectively.  Three types of training and three types of 
test files, each containing varying numbers of terrorists, were created for each 
variation on the input file.   
The effectiveness of a neural network is greatly reduced when the number of 
variables (horizontal), do not have adequate training pattern examples (vertical), 
as the network does not have the opportunity to explore a large proportion of the 
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possibilities. It is therefore necessary to prune the input file of unnecessary 
variables prior to training. It is apparent that by knowing which variables are 
contributing to the neural network [12] the developer has not only improved the 
effectiveness of the networks ability to generalise but also gains a better 
understanding of the problem. Experiments were performed excluding different 
variables within the import file to enable the ultimate level of accuracy given the 
number of training patterns available. 
Due to the severe lack of training data the results were predictably inaccurate, 
though much better than anticipated. This did not however present a problem, as 
the purpose of phase one was to experiment with different tools, architectures, 
input variables, the ratio of positive and negative patterns presented within the 
training and test files and to identify the optimal classification threshold within the 
output. A total of 55 neural network experiments were. A threshold of 0.5 was 
used as the cut-off point, where a value of 0 indicated „builder‟ and a value of 1 
indicated „terrorist‟, therefore any result greater than or equal to 0.5 was deemed 
to be a terrorist. The RMSE was plotted for each experiment during training to 
establish the optimum number of times the neural network was presented with the 
entire training set, known as an epoch. It is crucial not to over train the network as 
it has then the potential to memorise the training data and therefore looses the 
ability to generalise with different data. 
The Mann Whitney U test [13] was used to ascertain whether differences 
between two sets of result data could not have occurred by chance alone. Firstly, 
the least successful set of neural network results were compared against the most 
successful set. Secondly, the most successful set were compared against a random 
set of 28 zeros and ones. An online automated calculation tool [14] was used to 
perform the final part of the tests, as significance lookup tables do not have U 
values beyond 30; these results are shown below: 
 Test 1: The two samples are not significantly different (P>=0.05, two-tailed 
test). 
 Test 2: The difference between the two samples is highly significant (P < 
0.001, two-tailed test). 
These tests prove the value of the neural network even with such small amounts 
of training data. Altering the threshold to determine whether an output was 
positive or negative had a direct effect on the success rate of the network. If the 
initial threshold value of 0.5 was shifted down to a value of 0.13 the number of 
true positives was increased from 53% to 60%. This had a slightly negative effect 
on the total number of correct classifications within the test files, taking the 
percentage down from 64% to 60%. This percentage loss was deemed acceptable, 
as it was not identifying terrorists from the entire population, but identifying 
individuals who merited further investigation from a preselected subset who where 
under suspicion.  This was identified as a suitable capability by the stakeholders4 
when consulted regarding functionality for the system. 
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4 Results and Conclusions 
The experiments showed on average a 60% success rate (68% peek) for correctly 
identifying terrorist behaviour. The winning architecture consisted of all three 
layers; input, hidden and output using the sigmoid activation function. The hidden 
layer contained 10 neurons which resulted in 11% of the number of variables 
contained within the input file.  The information variables which proved to be of 
importance were „locations‟, „Stock Items‟ and „Stock Take‟. Excluded variables 
were „Game Number‟, „Colour‟ and „Van Weight‟. The patterns within the 
training file were presented to the neural network randomly rather than in 
sequence using over 1500 epochs.  
Certain rows within the input file were consistently classified either correctly 
or incorrectly, obtaining either a minimum of a 90 percent success rate or a 
maximum of 10 percent success rate throughout all 50 neural network 
experiments. The proportion of these successful and unsuccessful rows that were 
terrorist patterns of behaviour was 14% and 71% respectively. After analysing 
these rows it was apparent that the neural network had generalised much better for 
the builders, this was as expected given there were more builder examples in the 
training files. From the correctly identified terrorist rows, the neural network 
performed far better for those who used dynamite to carry out the tasks rather than 
those using fertiliser, again due to more terrorists using dynamite. Not all games 
were played in full; they ended when a player won, which is another reason for the 
neural network incorrectly classifying records. The next stage of development 
would have been to introduce the concept of pattern completeness; this would be 
to train and refine the neural network on patterns with varying degrees of 
completeness and identify chunks of behaviour which were deceptive in isolation. 
This type of discrete deception identification would be far more valuable in 
reality. 
Problem domains such as counter-terrorism intrinsically contain many 
information variables. Each time a variable is added, the number of possible 
pattern combinations increases exponentially. Therefore, with 100 variables within 
the input file, a vast number of rows would be required to cover just a small 
number of possible combinations of data. Take for example the winning neural 
network where only location information, stock items and stock take information 
was used (92 variables), each variable had an average of four possible values, i.e.  
492, resulting in 2.45 x 1055 rows of training data required to cover every possible 
combination. This poses a problem, as large numbers of historical patterns of 
terrorist behaviour are not available. 
Overall the neural network showed extremely promising results taking into 
account the sparse amount of training data.  Future work is underway to develop a 
method for generating behavioural data, building on the rules of the board game. 
This is planned to be done by combining intelligent agents [15] with gene 
expression programming [16] and the use of an Emdros database [17].  
A neural network has great potential in the quest to aid counter-terrorism, 
though certain pre-requisites must be met. These include providing an adequate set 
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of training data; identification of an optimal results classification threshold; and 
performing pre-processing to undertake tasks with which neural networks have 
difficulty, such as cross referencing rows against column data. 
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